The Constitutional Void and Its Discontents: Allen Drury’s Advise and Consent Series and the Pathology of American Power

Abstract: Allen Drury’s Advise and Consent series (1959–1975) occupies a peculiar position in American letters: Pulitzer Prize–winning, commercially dominant, and yet almost entirely neglected by literary scholarship. This essay argues that the series’ neglect is symptomatic of a critical failure to take seriously the political novel as a mode of institutional analysis rather than mere ideological expression. Reading Drury through the lens of constitutional indeterminacy, elite theory, and the generic constraints of the Washington novel, the essay contends that the series’ enduring value lies not in its Cold War prescriptions—which history rendered obsolete—but in its diagnostic account of the “intangibles” that fill the void between advice and consent. Drury’s Washington, for all its dated manners and Manichaean anticommunism, remains recognizably our Washington: a place where private frailty is weaponized against public principle, where the press co-produces the reality it claims to observe, and where the fantasy of resolute leadership masks the structural anxieties it promises to resolve.

Introduction

There are no major critical studies of Allen Drury’s work by literary scholars other than Tom Kemme’s 1987 monograph . This fact, noted with something like resignation by the one scholar who has recently attempted to take Drury seriously, ought to give us pause. Drury won the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 1960. His debut novel, Advise and Consent, spent 102 weeks on the New York Times bestseller list and, according to one account, “gave birth to the modern Washington novel” . Yet the academic apparatus that has canonized Gore Vidal’s Washington novels, that reads Joan Didion’s Democracy as a meditation on narrative and power, that treats Ward Just as a serious literary artist, has almost nothing to say about the writer who, for better and worse, created the template those later novelists would revise. The neglect is not merely an oversight. It reflects a set of assumptions about what political fiction is for—assumptions that Drury’s work, at its best, exposes as inadequate.

This essay attempts a scholarly and literary reconsideration of the Advise and Consent series, from the 1959 novel through the alternate-ending volumes of the 1970s. It proceeds from a conviction that Drury’s literary failures are as instructive as his insights, and that the series constitutes a sustained, if uneven, inquiry into the constitutive fragility of liberal constitutional order. The argument unfolds in four movements. First, it examines the founding insight of the series: the “fundamental ambiguity” at the heart of the advice-and-consent clause and the “intangibles” of sex, personality, and character that rush into the constitutional void . Second, it turns to the figure of Orrin Knox and the fantasy of resolute leadership that dominates the later volumes, reading Drury’s alternate-history experiment as an inadvertent critique of its own hero. Third, it considers the series’ institutional epistemology—its account of the press as co-producer of political reality—and its relevance to a fragmented media environment Drury could not have imagined. Finally, it confronts the question of literary style, arguing that Drury’s much-maligned prose is symptomatic of a generic choice rather than a mere deficiency, and that the political novel’s capacity to model institutional process is a virtue that literary criticism has been too quick to dismiss.

The Constitutional Void and the Intangibles of Power

The phrase “advice and consent” appears in Article II of the Constitution as a description of the Senate’s role in appointments and treaties. It is, as Kemme observes, a formulation of remarkable weakness: “‘Advice’ is not a strong word. And taking or not taking advice is a fairly nebulous situation” . What results is “an instability, a fundamental ambiguity, at the very heart of power, between the Congress and the President” . It is this instability, Kemme continues, that “allows the free play of the more intangible types of power that begin where the constitution breaks off: sex, personality, and character. Things which are left out of civics textbooks” .

This is Drury’s foundational insight, and it is more theoretically sophisticated than his critics have generally allowed. The political novel, in this account, is not primarily a dramatization of policy conflict—the contest over this or that bill, this or that nominee. It is an exploration of the affective and libidinal economies that fill the spaces formal institutions leave empty. The nomination of Robert Leffingwell for Secretary of State in Advise and Consent is, in this reading, almost incidental: a McGuffin that sets in motion the real drama of hidden histories, compromised desires, and the blackmail that exploits the gap between public persona and private truth.

The novel’s central tragedy—the blackmail and suicide of Senator Brigham Anderson over a wartime homosexual affair—is often read as a period piece about 1950s hypocrisy, and it is certainly that. But it is also a structural necessity. The system demands a coherence between public and private self that its participants cannot sustain. Anderson’s refusal to perform that coherence, his insistence on the integrity of his hidden life, renders him unusable. His death is the price of the fiction that governance is conducted by whole persons rather than by curated fragments. The novel never uses the word “homosexual,” as one plot summary notes, but Anderson’s struggle with his orientation—his marriage, his Mormon faith, his sense of himself as a public man—is rendered with a sympathy that complicates any reading of the book as merely reactionary .

David Smit’s 2019 study, the most sustained scholarly treatment of Drury to date, reads this dimension through the lens of elite theory. Smit argues that Drury portrays a “moderate ruling-elite ideology” in which senators’ “upper-class desire for personal fulfillment and ‘desire to serve’” manifests “primarily in their personal ambition and sense of integrity rather than any shared ideology or empirical examination of the world as it is” . This is a sharp observation, but it may understate Drury’s complicity in the ideology he depicts. The senators of Advise and Consent are defined less by programmatic commitments than by their self-conception as honorable men—a self-conception Drury largely shares. As Smit notes, the novel’s treatment of communism “relies on political stereotypes and reduces the issue to an overly simple binary choice: aggression versus appeasement” . Drury’s critique of elite governance is thus only partial: he exposes the fragility of the ruling class’s self-image without questioning the premise that this class should rule.

The Orrin Knox Problem: The Fantasy of Resolute Leadership

The later volumes of the series pivot on Orrin Knox, the senior senator from Illinois who embodies Drury’s fantasy of principled, hawkish leadership. The structural audacity of publishing two divergent futures—Come Nineveh, Come Tyre (1973), in which Knox’s hardline anticommunism prevails, and The Promise of Joy (1975), in which his pacifist rival Edward Jason ascends—constitutes a kind of natural experiment in the novel form, testing the proposition that individual character determines national destiny. What the experiment reveals, however, is less the validity of Drury’s thesis than the poverty of his political imagination.

The critical consensus on the later Drury is brutal. Erik Tarloff, reviewing Drury’s final novel in 1999, offered a representative judgment: “One doesn’t read a book like this in expectation of elegant writing. Nor does one find it” . Tarloff quotes a characteristic sentence and concludes: “To call the style wooden is a calumny on the timber industry” . More damning still is the epistemological problem. Drury’s Cold War framework was not merely conservative but counterfactual. The Soviet Union collapsed. The civil rights movement succeeded despite Drury’s calls for patience. The radical protesters of the 1960s largely assimilated. History, as one retrospective notes, “did not cooperate” with Drury’s dystopian projections.

Yet the impulse behind Knox remains analytically useful. The desire for a figure of unshakeable conviction who cuts through constitutional ambiguity with executive decisiveness is not a conservative monopoly; it is the affective core of populist movements across the spectrum. What Drury could not see—what his ideological commitments prevented him from seeing—is that the Knoxian fantasy is itself a symptom of the disease it purports to cure. The demand for a strongman arises precisely because the constitutional void Drury identified in his first novel generates intolerable anxiety. The political novel’s proper task, one might argue against Drury, is not to resolve that anxiety through fantasy but to sustain it, to keep the ambiguity visible.

The alternate-ending experiment thus produces an unintended irony. By offering two futures contingent on a single election, Drury meant to demonstrate the centrality of individual virtue to national fate. What he actually demonstrated is the opposite: that his political imagination was so constrained by the binaries of the Cold War that neither future could escape them. The Knox who prevails in The Promise of Joy is not a complex statesman but a wish-fulfillment figure; the Jason who fails in Come Nineveh, Come Tyre is not a tragic liberal but a straw man. The novels’ failure is not that they are propaganda—political fiction can survive propaganda—but that their propaganda is so crude that it forecloses the very ambiguity Drury’s first novel had the courage to confront.

The Journalist as Collaborator: Drury’s Institutional Epistemology

Drury’s Washington is populated not only by senators but by journalists whose power is disproportionate to their constitutional role. The New York Times’s fiftieth-anniversary retrospective noted that “in Drury’s capital, printed newspaper editorials still drive the action” . This is a world in which a single column can end a nomination, in which the narrative about a political fight often becomes more consequential than the fight itself.

The contemporary relevance of this dimension is difficult to overstate. Where Drury’s journalists operated within a relatively stable institutional hierarchy—the Times, the Post, the networks—today’s information ecosystem is fragmented and accelerated beyond anything his characters could imagine. Yet the underlying dynamic persists: the struggle to control the story of motives, to curate the backstory, to weaponize the private against the public. The Drury-esque “opposition research dump” is now a continuous condition rather than a discrete event. The novel form’s capacity to render this condition—to show how the public and private selves of political actors are mutually constituted and mutually destructive—remains one of its distinctive advantages over journalism.

There is, however, a subtler point to be made about Drury’s journalists. In Advise and Consent, as one reader notes, the press is “less well-defined” than the senators; members of the media are identified “only by their paper, network, or service” . This is not merely a failure of characterization. It is an epistemological claim. The press, in Drury’s rendering, is a collective function rather than a collection of individuals—a chorus whose utterances possess the authority of institutional voice rather than the fallibility of personal judgment. The senators have backstories; the journalists have only outlets. This asymmetry reflects Drury’s own position as a former Senate correspondent, someone who had been inside the institutional machinery and had come to see the press as part of that machinery rather than as an external check upon it.

Style, Genre, and the Political Novel’s Proper Task

Any serious assessment of Drury must confront the question of literary quality, and here the verdict is nearly unanimous. The Times’s 2009 retrospective observed that Drury “was the kind of nonfiction-writer turned novelist who remains better at telling than showing,” whose “fact-filled back stories are so plainly and well presented that his characters often seem more lifelike when being wound up than when put in motion” . The comparison to C. P. Snow, invoked in the same review, is apt: both writers subordinated style to the exposition of institutional process, and both have suffered critical neglect for doing so .

But the question of style is not merely aesthetic. It is generic. Drury understood the novel as a vehicle for information—procedural, biographical, psychological—rather than as a structure of experience. The elaborate backstories that fill his pages are not, in the modernist sense, techniques for revealing character; they are dossiers. The reader is positioned less as a witness to consciousness than as a recipient of intelligence. This is why Drury’s characters often feel more vivid in summary than in scene: they are constructions of data, not presences. The political novel, in Drury’s hands, becomes a kind of fictionalized briefing document, and its pleasures are the pleasures of insider knowledge rather than of literary art.

Whether this constitutes a fatal flaw or a generic peculiarity depends on one’s criteria. If the political novel is judged by the standards of the novel tout court—Jamesian density, Woolfian interiority, Nabokovian prose—Drury fails. If it is judged by its capacity to model the operational logic of a political system, to make legible the interactions of institutions and personalities that constitute governance, his achievement is more substantial. Ken Ringle, writing in the Washington Post at the time of Drury’s death, quoted a colleague’s assessment: “I doubt that there was one American in 1,000 then who understood how the committee system in Congress really operated. That was his very real achievement: showing how this huge machine that affects your life really works” . This is not a trivial achievement, and it is not one that literary criticism has developed adequate tools to evaluate.

Conclusion: Drury’s Diagnostic Legacy

The scholarly literature on Drury remains thin, and the reasons are not difficult to discern. His politics are unpalatable to most academic critics; his style offers little purchase for formal analysis; his historical moment has receded. Yet the questions he posed in 1959 have not been answered, and the pathologies he diagnosed have, if anything, intensified. The constitutional void between advice and consent remains. The intangibles of sex, personality, and character continue to fill it. The fantasy of the resolute leader continues to seduce. The press continues to co-produce political reality while imagining itself to be observing it.

What a scholarly and literary focus on Drury ultimately yields is not a rehabilitation of his reputation but a clearer understanding of what the political novel can and cannot do. It cannot, as Drury hoped in his later volumes, resolve the ambiguities of governance through ideological fiat. It can, as his first and best novel demonstrated, render those ambiguities visible, make them felt as the lived texture of political life rather than as abstractions for civics textbooks. The Advise and Consent series is a flawed monument, but it is a monument nonetheless—a record of one writer’s sustained attempt to think through, in narrative form, what it means to govern and be governed in a constitutional order that is, at its foundation, incomplete. That Drury himself could not finally tolerate the incompleteness he had diagnosed is the series’ tragedy. That we continue to live within the conditions he described is its enduring claim on our attention.


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