The Convention of Turin (1860): The Realpolitik Pact that Forged a Nation

Article Date: October 26, 2023
Author: Margaret Ashford

Introduction

The birth of modern Italy, the Risorgimento, is often remembered for its heroic figures and bloody battles: Garibaldi’s red-shirts, the defiance of Mazzini’s republicans, and the battlefields of Magenta and Solferino. Yet, one of the most pivotal events in this unification process was not fought with muskets and cannon, but with pens and secret protocols. The Convention of Turin, signed on March 24, 1860, was a masterclass in realpolitik—the politics of practical rather than moral or ideological considerations. This diplomatic agreement between the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia and the Second French Empire traded territory for political freedom, directly enabling the creation of the Kingdom of Italy and simultaneously creating grievances that would simmer for generations.

This article will deconstruct the convention, analyzing the deep political motivations of the key figures, the immediate consequences, and its lasting legacy on the European map.

1. The Precipice: The Unstable Geopolitics of 1859-60

To understand the Convention, one must first appreciate the precarious situation in the aftermath of the Second Italian War of Independence (1859).

The Broken Promise of Plombières: In 1858, Piedmontese Prime Minister Camillo Benso di Cavour and French Emperor Napoleon III met secretly at Plombières. They agreed to provoke a war with Austria. The terms were clear: France would receive the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice in return for its military aid, leading to a new Kingdom of Northern Italy under the House of Savoy.
The Shock of Villafranca: The war was going well for the Franco-Piedmontese alliance. However, after the bloody battles of Magenta and Solferino, Napoleon III, sickened by the casualties and fearing the rise of a too-powerful Piedmont and the potential intervention of other German states, abruptly signed the Armistice of Villafranca with Austria. The terms were a severe blow to Cavour: Austria ceded Lombardy but kept the Veneto, and the central Italian rulers (in Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna) were to be restored. Cavour, feeling utterly betrayed, resigned in a fury.
The Revolutionary Reality: The populations of central Italy refused to accept the return of their old, despotic rulers. They established pro-Piedmontese provisional governments and held plebiscites that overwhelmingly voted for annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia. By early 1860, central Italy was, in practice, holding the door open for Piedmont to walk in, but international law, backed by Austria and (officially) France, stood in the way.

The stage was set for a crisis. Piedmont needed to annex the central states to survive and grow, but it needed France’s blessing to do so without triggering a wider war.

2. The Political Chessboard: A Deep Dive into Key Figures’ Positions

The Convention of Turin was the product of complex and often conflicting motivations among its principal architects.

Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour (Piedmont-Sardinia):

Primary Goal: The complete unification of Northern and Central Italy under the House of Savoy. He was a pragmatic nationalist, willing to use any means necessary.
Political Calculus: Cavour saw the central Italian states as the essential core for a viable Italian kingdom. He knew that the price for French acquiescence was the cession of Savoy and Nice, as promised at Plombières. For him, this was a painful but necessary trade.
- Quote: (Upon his return to office, regarding the central Italian situation) “We must be practical. We cannot achieve everything at once. If we can secure the heart of Italy, we can build the body later. Savoy and Nice are the price; we must pay it.”
The Dilemma: The cession was politically dangerous. Savoy was the ancestral homeland of the royal family, and Nice was the birthplace of the republican hero Giuseppe Garibaldi. Cavour had to balance national expansion with domestic and nationalist outrage.

Napoleon III (France):

Primary Goal: To enhance French prestige and strategic security while maintaining a balance of power in Italy. He wanted a weak, fragmented Italy friendly to France, not a strong, unified neighbor.
Political Calculus: Napoleon III was trapped by his own contradictions. He genuinely sympathized with the Italian nationalist cause (having fought with the Carbonari in his youth) but was also a conservative emperor who needed to appease powerful French Catholic voters, who were horrified by the threat to the Pope’s temporal power.
- His Solution: Allow Piedmont to grow, but at a cost. By taking Savoy and Nice, he achieved several objectives:
  1. He secured France’s “natural frontier” on the Alps, a long-standing strategic goal.
  2. He obtained tangible compensation for the 1859 war, placating his military and taxpayers.
  3. He weakened Piedmont symbolically by taking its royal homeland, theoretically checking its future ambitions.
Quote: (In a private dispatch) “We cannot allow Piedmont to imagine it can reshape Italy alone. It must remember it owes its new stature to France. Savoy and Nice are not just payment; they are a reminder.”

Giuseppe Garibaldi (The Italian Revolution):

Primary Goal: A unified, democratic Italian republic. He was a man of action and ideals, fundamentally opposed to Cavour’s monarchical and diplomatic maneuvering.
Political Calculus: Garibaldi was a native of Nice. The news that his birthplace was to be handed over to France was a profound personal and political betrayal. It confirmed his view that Cavour and the monarchy were willing to sacrifice Italian soil and republican principles for their own gain.
- Quote: (Upon hearing of the convention) “Cavour has made me a foreigner in my own country! He is a villain, and this is an act of treason against the Italian nation itself!”
Consequence: This fury directly fueled Garibaldi’s subsequent actions. Just two months later, he launched his famous Expedition of the Thousand to conquer the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in part to pre-empt any deal Cavour might make to stop southern unification.

Victor Emmanuel II (King of Piedmont-Sardinia):

Primary Goal: To expand his kingdom and become the king of a united Italy.
Political Calculus: As the head of the House of Savoy, ceding the dynasty’s ancestral lands was a deeply painful personal blow. However, he was a pragmatic soldier-king who understood the strategic necessity. He trusted Cavour’s judgment that this was the only way to secure a kingdom worth having.
- Position: He ultimately gave his reluctant consent, prioritizing the crown of a larger Italy over the sentimental value of Savoy.

3. The Convention Itself: Terms and Immediate Aftermath

Signed on March 24, 1860, the treaty contained two core actions:

The Cession: Piedmont-Sardinia ceded the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice to France.
The Annexation: France formally recognized and would not oppose the annexation of the central Italian states (Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna) by Piedmont-Sardinia.

To legitimize this territorial exchange in the eyes of Europe, both changes were to be ratified by popular plebiscites. The votes, held in April 1860, returned overwhelming majorities in favor (e.g., 99.8% in Nice, 99.2% in Savoy). However, these plebiscites were widely considered to be manipulated, with voting conducted under military oversight and with no option for the status quo, serving as a democratic fig leaf for a pre-arranged deal.

4. Analysis and Lasting Legacy

The Convention of Turin’s impact was immediate and profound.

The Creation of Italy: Piedmont-Sardinia doubled its size and population, becoming the undeniable core of a future Italian state. The Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed just over a year later, in March 1861. The convention provided the critical mass and international legitimacy needed for this final step.
The “Piedmontisation” of Italy: The new Italian state inherited Piedmont’s institutions, bureaucracy, and legal code, creating a top-down, centralized model of unification that led to long-term tensions, particularly with the South after its annexation.
The Italia Irredenta Movement: The “loss” of Savoy and Nice, and especially the Italian-speaking areas of Nice and the surrounding county, created a potent nationalist grievance. Italia Irredenta (“Unredeemed Italy”) became a rallying cry for Italian nationalists, influencing foreign policy and contributing to the irredentist fervor that led Italy into World War I against Austria-Hungary.
A Shift in European Alliances: Great Britain, which had been sympathetic to Italian unification, was alarmed by France’s territorial expansion. This deepened British distrust of Napoleon III and contributed to a more cautious European diplomacy, moving away from the post-1815 settlement.

Conclusion

The Convention of Turin stands as a definitive case study in the pragmatic, often cynical, statecraft that forged modern Europe. It was a transaction where land was currency and national destiny was the commodity. Cavour secured the foundation of a nation, while Napoleon III secured a frontier and sowed the seeds of future limitation. Yet, the ghost of this deal haunted Italy for decades in the form of irredentist claims and the bitter memory of a “mutilated victory.” It reminds us that the maps of nations are often drawn not just by the blood of heroes, but by the cold, calculated ink of diplomats.

Sources and References

Primary Sources:

The text of the Treaty of Turin (March 24, 1860). French National Archives.
Cavour’s diplomatic correspondence, available in collected works such as “Carteggio Cavour-Nigra” (Lettere di Cavour, 1883).
“The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi” provide contemporary insight into the Garibaldian perspective and the outrage over the convention.

Secondary Sources:

Beales, Derek, & Biagini, Eugenio F. (2002). The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy. Routledge. (Provides excellent context on the diplomatic maneuvering).
Duggan, Christopher. (2007). The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796. Houghton Mifflin. (A masterful narrative that analyzes the long-term cultural and political consequences).
Smith, Denis Mack. (1985). Cavour. Knopf. (The definitive biography in English, offering a critical and detailed analysis of Cavour’s political strategies).
Hearder, H. (1983). Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790-1870. Longman. (Excellent for the broader European context).